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THE "COST" OF SECURING
DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL
I.

INTRODUCTION

A mother was traveling through an airport in St. Petersburg, Florida on her way back from visiting her daughter in college. When she
passed through a metal detector, she was told her bag needed to be
searched. Before she had passed through the metal detector, she removed all metal objects from her person. She passed through the detector without setting off any alarm, and there was no indication of concern
by security personnel about the bag she was carrying on the plane. This
mother just happened to be picked at random to have her bag searched.
She has never been convicted of a crime and she is white. She was pulled
to the side, and the contents of her carry-on were dumped out on a table
in public; her bra, panties and other personal items for all the travelers
to see. The only reason she was searched was because she was randomly
picked to be searched.'
A father was flying to Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C. from the
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport for business. He passed through
the security checkpoint at American Airlines at O'Hare and passed without being stopped. He was not chosen to be randomly searched. On his
way back home, he was stopped at the security checkpoint at Dulles after
his bag went through the x-ray machine. His entire bag was not
searched, but he did have to surrender a corkscrew that was in his bag.
This father did not intend to use the corkscrew for an illegal purpose on
the airplane; he simply carries it to open a bottle of wine that he drinks
at night in the hotel room. This may be an example of how the heightened airport security measures are working, but there is one problem:
2
this father had the corkscrew since he left his home in Illinois.
These two scenarios illustrate how inconsistent airline security is in
the United States. The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon changed the way everyone in the United
States viewed airline security.3 The weapons used by the hijackers on
1. Interview with Irene DiGuglielmo, Homemaker (Aug. 8, 2002).
2. Interview with James E. Miller, President, The Miller Research Group, Inc. (Apr.
13, 2002).
3. Michael Gilbert, Americans Get Used to Increased Security as Way of Life, The
News Trib. 1 5 (Sept. 10, 2002).
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September 11 were allowed on planes at the time. 4 People, from security
experts to laypeople, have always questioned the effectiveness of airline
security. After the Pan Am 103 incident over Lockerbie, Scotland, 5 airlines focused their security efforts on questioning whether passengers
have kept their bags in their possession and if any stranger asked them
to carry anything on the plane for them. 6 The concern with airline security changes is that many of them are enacted as a response to some event
that illustrated a breach in the current measures or procedures. 7 Government officials viewed the massive security changes following September 11 as necessary because the previous measures were weak and
inadequate, causing a crisis overnight for the newly created Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). 8 Even with the changes in airline
security, have our new security measures improved air transportation or
have they created additional problems?
The security changes since September 11 have not met their stated
goals. "[The security changes] did create additional work right after the
incident, but a lot of that has leveled off since then.... It's not on the
forefront of people's minds." 9 Airport managers have been stretched to
the max, and the transition has not been smooth, but the improvement
has been phenomenal. 10 Some Americans have been frustrated with the
rigidity of the security changes. 1 ' Rajeev Patel of Snyder, Texas, has
questioned why he has been stopped for a random search at the gate
4. Random Security Checks Must Be Useful or Be Gone, The Pantagraph (Bloomington, IL) Editorial A12 $ 10 (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Random Security].
5. Richard Blystone, Remembering the Lockerbie Tragedy 6 <http://www.cnn.com /
2000/LAW/08/21/blystone.memories/index.html> (accessed Apr. 3, 2003). Pan Am Flight
103, en route from New York to Frankfort, exploded over Lockerbie Scotland on December
21, 1988. Id. The cause of the explosion was a bomb. Id. Two hundred and fifty-nine
passengers died in the explosion, while another eleven died on the ground from the debris.
Id. at 3. Two Libyan men were indicted for their roles in the bombing. CNN, U.S. to
Mark Anniversary of Lockerbie Bombing 1 8 <http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/16/panam1O3.
clinton/index.html> (accessed Apr. 3, 2003).
6. Random Security, supra n. 4, at 11.
7. Id. at
9.
8. Jim Sloan, An Air of Caution, Tampa Trib., Nation/World 1 30 (Sept. 6, 2002).
9. Gilbert, supra n. 3, at 4.
10. Todd Hartman & Kevin Flynn, DIA's DelicateDilemma;Airport Officials Having to
Balance Security Needs with Consumer Service, 144 Rocky Mountain News, City Desk/Local 30A 1 10 (Sept. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Hartman & Flynn]. Tom Nunn, Director of Aviation Safety, Security and Regulatory Compliance, Frontier Airlines, said "[Slince
September 11, all of us have been stretched to the max. While it hasn't necessarily been
smooth, in terms of how well the airport has done, compared to what we've been up against,
it's phenomenal." Id.
11. See e.g. Julie Breaux, Director of Odessa, Texas-Area Airport Has Had Plenty to Do
Since Sept. 11, Odessa American 1A %]29 (Sept. 8,2002) (quoting a passenger who has
been frequently stopped).
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three or four times since September 11, 2001.12 Patel said, "[lt just
takes longer. I can't really blame them, but still."1 3 For as many successes as the changes have had, 1 4 there have been several instances
where the changes have produced less than desirable results.' 5 The
worst result was the Richard Reid incident. Reid boarded a flight in
London that was bound for the United States, and he packed his shoes
with explosives to allegedly bring down the American Airlines plane he
was on. 16 This incident illustrated how easily clothes can be used to con12. Id.
13. Id. at 1$ 28, 30.
14. For example, here are two situations of how the new airline security measures
succeeded in stopping an individual from breaching air safety. Subash Gurung had knives
and a stun gun in his carry-on bag, which successfully passed a security checkpoint at
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. Kathleen Koch, PassengerProfiling Beefed Up at
Airports 1 1 <http://www.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/11/08/rec.passenger.profilingindex.html> (accessed Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Koch I]. The airline passenger profiling system pegged Mr. Gurung as an individual who needed additional screening at the gate. Id.
at 2. Upon conducting the additional screening, Mr. Gurung was arrested and not allowed to board the plane. Id. A second example was relatively more successful. Barry
Brunstein flew round trip from Tampa, Florida to Memphis, Tennessee, with a layover in
4 <http://
Atlanta. CNN, FBI: Man Boarded 2 Flights with Gun in Luggage
www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/29/airport.gun/index.html> (accessed Oct. 5, 2002). The authorities claimed that Brunstein was trying to accumulate frequent-flyer miles, and that there
was no connection to any planned terrorist act or incident. Id. at 3. Brunstein's gun was
discovered when he was randomly selected at the gate in Memphis for additional screenings. Id. at 5. The only negative to the incident was that he was able to take the gun on
two previous flights on the trip. Id. at [[ 3, 5.
15. Former U.S. Senator and Vice President Al Gore has been randomly selected twice
for additional security screenings. Good Judgment, 19 Investor's Business Daily, Issues &
Insights, Editorial A16 6 (Sept. 12, 2002). One commentator noted, "Sorting through
9. Former Vice President Walter
Gore's shorts would not [be good judgment]." Id. at
Mondale missed a flight because of "security-related" delays. Id. at 6. Even Lisa Beamer,
wife of Todd Beamer, who cried "Let's roll" on United Airlines Flight 93, was randomly
selected for additional security inspections. Id. But the most offensive example of the misgivings of the new security measures occurred to Marge Williams, a public relations and
marketing executive from Detroit. Holly Hanson, Fashion at the Gate Fly Through Security with Smart Clothing Choices, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Arts & Ent. G-6 17 (Sept. 29, 2002).
Williams had flown monthly since September 11, 2001. Id. Many times she had gone
through a metal detector, and the underwire of her bra set off the machine. Id. at 18.
She was subjected to additional security measures, which in cases like these, are conducted
in private due to the sensitivity of the subject matter of the search. Id. Instead, Ms. Williams had been subjected to these searches in public, which caused great humiliation. Id.
The security personnel waved the metal detector wand over her body, and then several of
them tugged at the bra to make sure that nothing was concealed either inside the bra or
behind it. Id. at $ 19. Ms. Williams was embarrassed that such an invasive procedure was
done for all travelers to see. Id. at $ 19.
16. Id. at 1. The attempt to blow up the plane was just some three months after the
attacks of September 11. Shoe Bomber Pleads Guilty While Laughing, 130 Daily Herald, 6
9118 (Oct. 5, 2002). On October 4, 2002, Reid pleaded guilty to charges resulting from the
plot. Id. at 1 1. He pleaded guilty to the following charges: "attempted use of a weapon of
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ceal non-metal weapons. 17
Public opinion also shows a trend that is disturbing to government
security officials and airport managers.1 8 An August 2002 poll showed
that seventy-five percent of Americans made no changes to their lifestyle
to reduce the chances of dying from an act of terrorism. 19 FirstAir.net
Vice President Robert Laney said, "[o]ur survey shows that Americans
remain very security conscious and that full trust remains to be restored
in the handling of security at U.S. airlines."20 Moreover, two-thirds of
the respondents to an Associated Press poll in August 2002 felt concerned that the new security measures restricted their individual
21
liberties.
The airline security measures required to make the airways as safe
as possible and reduce delays at airports have some conflicts with the
constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. This comment
will focus on how technological efficiency of airport security interacts
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Part I will discuss the
changes in airline security since September 11, 2001, key Fourth Amendment principles and the judicial recognition of airline security. Part II
will examine the effectiveness of current and proposed security procedures, the constitutionality of proposed measures and the underlying
policy considerations of all airline security procedures. Part III will propose a solution that meets both the goals of airline security and is technologically, constitutionally and fiscally feasible.

mass destruction, attempted homicide, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, attempted murder, two counts of interference with flight crew and attendants, attempted
destruction of an aircraft, and using a destructive device during a crime of violence." Id. at
7. Prosecutors are recommending that Reid receive 60 years to life. Id. at 9. FBI
investigators are trying to find out who helped Reid plan the attack. Id. at 16.
17. Hanson, supra n. 15, at
1.
18. See generally Seventy Percent of International Business/First Class Passengers

Traveling Less Than a Year Ago; Seventy-five Percent to Curtail Travel Around 9111;
Twenty-eight Percent Have Weak Trust of U.S. Air Security: FirstAir.Net Survey; Cost Savings Important to Eighty-five Percent and Seventy-five Percent are Buying First/Business
Class On-Line, PR Newswire, Fin. News (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Seventy Percent] (giving the results of a FirstAir.net opinion poll).
19. Gilbert, supra n. 3, at %7. Knight Ridder/Tribune conducted the poll. Id.
20. Seventy Percent, supra n. 18, at 5. Laney further commented that, "at the same
time, while Americans are still traveling less than a year ago, as security concerns abate,
they expect to travel more in the future. And they have significant economic issues with
the high costs of travel." Id.
21. Gilbert, supra n. 3, at %35 (describing the poll about anti-terrorism measures,
which include changes in airport security).
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II. BACKGROUND

Prior to 1973, airline security consisted of an air piracy profile, a
magnetometer search for metal objects for any passenger who met the
profile and a search of a passenger's carry-on baggage and person for
anyone activating the magnetometer. 22 The profile consisted of several
"objective characteristics to identify potential hijackers." 2 3 The current
security system, which remained in place after September 11, 2001, was
initiated by presidential order in 1972, requiring a mandatory search of
all carry-on baggage and a magnetometer screening of all passengers for
24
metal objects.
A.

AIRLINE SECURITY SINCE SEPTEMBER

11, 2001

Federal law requires that all persons wanting to board an aircraft
must submit to the screening and inspection of his or her person under
all applicable procedures. 25 Airport security includes many different
layers of procedures to attempt to prevent anything from slipping by to
endanger those using air transportation. 26 To help coordinate all the different layers of security, Congress created the TSA, under the governance of the Department of Transportation. 27 The TSA has the power to
regulate all security relating to civil aviation and all other modes of
transportation under the control of the Department of Transportation. 28
The screeners have several ways of executing their duties of actual
screening of passengers and baggage. Once all passengers cross through
the security checkpoints, a limited amount of passengers are randomly
selected for a more thorough screening procedure. 29 In addition to those
picked for random screening, any passenger who exhibits suspicious be22. U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. The characteristics were developed at an aviation and security professionals'
symposium, hosted by the Federal Aviation Administration. Id. For more information on
the symposium, see H. Comm. on Interstate and For. Commerce, Hearing on Aviation
Safety and Aircraft Piracy: FAA Report on Detection Devices, 91st Cong., 98-102 (Feb. 5,
1969).
24. Davis, 482 F.2d at 901.
25. 49 C.F.R. §1540.107 (2002).
26. See Random Security, supra n. 4, at $ 2.
27. 49 U.S.C. §114 (2002).
28. 49 U.S.C. §114(d). §114(d) states:
Functions. The Under Secretary shall be responsible for security in all modes of
transportation, including1) carrying out chapter 449, relating to civil aviation security, and related research
and development activities; and
2) security responsibilities over other modes of transportation over other modes of
transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation.
Id.
29. U.S. Dept. of Transp., FactSheet: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Air Travel of People Who Are or May Appear to Be ofArab, Middle Easternor South
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havior will be selected for additional screenings. 30 The additional
screenings consist of a hand-held metal detector and a pat-down search,
but may also include more thorough measures if the initial screening
shows concealment of a prohibited item. 3 1 At the security checkpoints,
those passengers who do not set off the metal detector can only be subjected to additional screenings on a random basis, and those who do set
off the metal detector will automatically be subjected to the additional
screenings. 3 2 If a search requires the removal of clothing, the passenger
33
has the right to choose a public or private inspection.
To complement the initial and random screenings, the Aviation and
TransportationSecurity Act required that all checked baggage by passengers be screened. 3 4 In order for the checked baggage to be screened
appropriately, airports were also required to install explosive detection
systems by December 31, 2002 to screen that baggage. 35 While the detection equipment is unavailable for the sixty-day grace period, screeners must use at least one alternative means of screening the checked
baggage. 36 The airline asked the government for an additional thirty
Asian Descent and/orMuslim or Sikh 2 <http://www.faa.gov/acr/dotat-rno.doc> (accessed
Oct. 5, 2002).
30. Id. at 3 n.3.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Aviation and TransportationSecurity Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §110(c), 115
Stat. 597, 615 (2001). Airports were required to implement this measure within sixty days
of passage of the legislation. Id. "A system must be in operation to screen all checked
baggage at all airports in the United States as soon as practicable but not later than the
[sixtieth] day following the date of enactment of the Aviation and TransportationSecurity
Act." Id.
35. Id. § 110(d) states:
(1) In general. - The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall take all
necessary action to ensure that (A) explosive detection systems are deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all
United States airports described in section 44903(c) have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002,
and that as soon as such systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at
the airport is screened by those systems; and
(B) all systems deployed under subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and
(C) if explosive detection equipment at an airport is unavailable, all baggage is
screened by an alternative means.
Id.
36. Id. § 110(e) states:
(e) Mandatory Screening Where EDS Not Yet Available. - As soon as practicable
but not later than the [sixtieth] day following the date of enactment of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act and until the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A)
are met, the Under Secretary shall require alternative means for screening any
piece of checked baggage that is not screened by an explosive detection system.
Such alternative means may include [one] or more of the following:
(1) A bag match program that ensures that no checked baggage is placed aboard
an aircraft unless the passenger who checked the baggage is aboard the aircraft.
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day extension to the grace period, 37 which was rejected by the Department of Transportation. 38 Three and a half million bags are checked as
"belly baggage" each day, and only ten percent of those are screened for
explosives. 3 9 It is estimated that "2,200 [machines will be needed] to
40
screen the 1.3 billion bags it handles every year."
Congress gave the TSA the right to compile passenger lists, or passenger profile lists, of those individuals who should be subjected to additional security screenings. 4 1 The profiling system highlights those
passengers who purchase one-way tickets, pay with cash, or have an unusual travel history. 4 2 These lists and their criteria are a growing cause
for concern among the American public. 4 3 The federal government
maintains that many people on the list are stopped not because of their
names being on the list, but their names resemble those on the list. 44 As
evidence, the government points to the fact that two of the September 11
hijackers used their real names to board the plane. 4 5 However, no fed(2) Manual search
(3) Search by canine explosive detection units in combination with other means.
(4) Other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.
Id.
37. CNN, Government Rejects Delay In Bag Check Deadline 1 5 <http://www.cnn.com I
2001JTRAVEIINEWS/12/19/baggage.screeninglindex.html> (accessed Mar. 27, 2003).
38. Id. at 1. "DOT officials say airlines were told to 'step up to the plate' and work to
meet the deadline and its requirements." Id. at 4. Representative James Oberstar (DOhio), ranking member of the House Transportation Committee, called the request for the
airline industry's extension "'appalling'" and remarked that the industry wanted the government to foot a larger portion of the responsibility for the new security. Id. at $ 9-10.
39. CNN, Mineta Outlines Bag Screening Guidelines 5 <http://www.cnn.com /2002/
TRAVELINEWS/01/16/rec.airport.security/index.html> (accessed Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter
Mineta].
40. Kathleen Koch, Airlines to Receive Guidance on Bag Screening
4 <http://
www.cnn. com/2002/TRAVEL/NEWS/01lll/airlines.baggage/index.html> (accessed Oct. 5,
2002) [hereinafter Koch 1I].
41. 115 Stat. at 599.
42. Koch I, supra n. 14, at 5.
43. Alan Gathright, No-Fly Blacklist Snares Political Activists, S.F. Chron. Al
3
(Sept. 27, 2002). Many believe that the profile lists will target activists and dissidents. Id.
at 5. Twenty members of a Wisconsin activist group were detained by airline officials for
additional screenings, forcing them to miss a meeting with congressional representatives.
Id. at 3. The group still has not been informed why they were stopped, especially since
only one member's name resembled a name on the airline's no-fly list. Id. at 23. Rebecca
Gordon, a veteran activist from San Francisco and co-founder of War Times, said, "'I think
it's a combination of an attempt to silence dissent by scaring people and probably a lot of
bumbling and inept implementation of some bad security protocols.'" Id. at 16. Gordon
and fellow activist Jan Adams were detained for additional screenings at San Francisco
International Airport after their boarding pass was marked with an "S," the designation
requiring further scrutiny. Gathright, The S.F. Chron. at 17.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at $ 6.
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eral agency knows who is responsible for maintaining the list. 4 6 Some
passengers do not know how or why their name gets on the list, and
others, who are on the list, are never taken off of it after being cleared as
a suspected security threat by the authorities. 47 Norman Mineta, United
States Secretary of Transportation, insists that the system does not take
ethnicity into account. 48 Others in the field believe that the system
49
should be more discriminating.
In addition to passenger and baggage screenings and the passenger
profiling lists, several other security measures were also put in place to
improve airline security. 50 First, with regard to screening airline passengers, the TSA is responsible for everyday federal screening operations, developing recruiting and retention standards for federal
screeners, testing and training federal screening workers, overseeing the
actual hiring and training of the federal screeners at all airports, 51 and
many other duties. 5 2 The TSA has control over all aspects of the federal
46. Id. at 9111.
47. Id. at 1 10. Jayashri Srikantiah, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties
Union of Northern California, illustrates this concern with the following quotation:
The problem is that this list has no public accountability: People don't know why
their names are put on or how to get their names off. We have heard complaints
from people who triggered the list a first time and then were cleared by security to
fly. But when they fly again, their name is triggered again.
Gathright, supra n. 43, at 10.
48. Koch II, supra n. 40, at 1 9 (describing the explanation that was supported by
Norman Mineta, U.S. Sec. of Transp).
49. Id. Neil Livingstone, Chairman and CEO, Global Options, states, "We are concerned about people from a particular region of the world. They tend to be young, they tend
to be male. And we ought to spend most of our time looking for them." Id. at 10. An
editorial in Investor's Business Daily suggests using the good judgment theory. "But discriminate is exactly what screeners should do. It's worth noting that one definition of discriminate is 'to use good judgment.'" Good Judgment, supra n. 15, at 918.
50. These security measures will only be discussed briefly because they have little or
no Fourth Amendment questions.
51. 49 U.S.C. §114(e).
52. 49 U.S.C. §114(f). §114(f) states:
Additional duties and powers. In addition to carrying out the functions specified
in subsections (d) and (e), the Under Secretary shall 1) receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation
security;
2) assess threats to transportation;
3) develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation
security;
4) make other plans related to transportation security, including coordinating
countermeasures with appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities
of the United States Government;
5) serve as the primary liaison for transportation security to the intelligence and
law enforcement communities;
6) on a day-by-day basis, manage, and provide operational guidance to the field
security resources of the Administration, including Federal Security Managers as
provided by section 44933;

2003]

"COST" OF SECURING DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL

security screeners. 53 In order to be hired as a security screener, a person
must achieve a satisfactory score on a federal security personnel selec54
tion exam, be a United States citizen, meet all employment standards,
other qualifications as determined by the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, and be able to perform the duties "without any impairment due to illegal drugs, sleep deprivation, medication or
alcohol." 5 5 Second, the last line of defense on a hijacked airliner is now
7) enforce security-related regulations and requirements;
8) identify and undertake research and development activities necessary to enhance transportation security;
9) inspect, maintain, and test security facilities, equipment, and systems;
10) ensure the adequacy of security measures for the transportation of cargo;
11) oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at
airports and other transportation facilities;
12) require background checks for airport security screening personnel, individuals with access to secure areas of airports, and other transportation security
personnel;
13) work in conjunction with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to any actions or activities that may affect aviation safety or
air carrier operations;
14) work with the International Civil Aviation Organization and appropriate aeronautic authorities of foreign governments under section 44907 to address security
concerns on passenger flights by foreign air carriers in foreign air transportation;
and
15) carry out such other duties, and exercise such other powers, relating to transportation security as the Under Secretary considers appropriate, to the extent authorized by law.
Id. The department also has the power to purchase or lease any real or personal property
necessary to carry out its objectives. 49 U.S.C. §114(j). Finally, the TSA has the power,
like any other federal agency, to issue regulations necessary to carry out its directives. 49
U.S.C. §114(k)(1).
53. See 49 U.S.C. §114 (giving TSA control of all airline security).
54. The employment standards are delineated in 49 U.S.C. §44935(f).
55. 49 U.S.C. §44935(e)(2)(A). All security screeners are subject to background checks,
49 U.S.C. §44935(e)(2)(B), and cannot be convicted of certain crimes. Id. The crimes are
listed in the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000:
(xiii) a felony involving a threat;
(xiv) a felony involving (I) willful destruction of property;
(II) importation or manufacture of a controlled substance;
(III) burglary;
(IV) theft;
(V) dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation;
(VI) possession or distribution of stolen property;
(VII) aggravated assault;
(VIII) bribery; and
(X) illegal possession of a controlled substance punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than 1 year, or any other crime classified as a felony that
the Administrator determines indicates a propensity for placing contraband
aboard an aircraft in return for money.
Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-528, §2(d)(4), 114 Stat. 2517,
2519 (2000). Federal screeners cannot begin their work in airports until they have completed 40 hours of classroom training or an equivalent program, worked 60 hours of on-the-
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an air (sky) marshal. The TSA allows for air marshals to be placed on all
flights. 56 However, air marshals are only required to be placed on flights
57
with high security risks.

B.

FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent "arbitrary and
oppressive [governmental] interference" with the personal privacy and
security of citizens. 58 The Fourth Amendment does not protect personal
privacy from all forms of government intrusion because other parts of the
Constitution are designed to protect their respective intrusions. 5 9 "A
search begins with the planning of the invasion and continues 'until effective appropriation' of the fruits of the search 'for subsequent proof of
an offense.'" 60 A person is considered to be seized under the Fourth
Amendment when "'if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.'" 6 1 The judicial system plays the role of setting the limits
for searches valid under the Fourth Amendment and "will not be made
party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by per62
mitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."
In determining a Fourth Amendment violation, courts examine the
public interest versus the individual interest. 63 Persons trying to invoke
the protections of the Fourth Amendment have to meet both a subjective
job training, and passed an on-the-job examination. 49 U.S.C. §44935(g)(2). The screeners
must also undergo continuous training on new technologies. 49 U.S.C. §44935(h)(1).
56. 115 Stat. at 607.
57. Id. Additionally, air carriers are required to provide air marshals seats on flights
at no charge to the federal government. Id. The carriers are also required to provide a seat
on a flight for an off-duty air marshal returning home. Id. The following people are eligible
to be air marshals: 1) retired law enforcement officers, 2) retired members of the Armed
Forces, and 3) individuals from flight crews who lost their jobs following September 11,
2001. Id.
58. U.S. v.Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (citing U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Camarav. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [olath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
59. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
60. Davis, 482 F.2d at 896.
61. Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
898, 116 L. Ed.2d 225, 112 S. Ct. 273 (1991).
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
63. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 555.
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and objective expectation requirement. 6 4 The Fourth Amendment protections extend to private areas, but not public areas. 6 5 At one time, it
66
was held that the protections were limited simply to tangible property,
but the Supreme Court has most recently held that the Fourth Amendment protections include certain intangible properties. 67 The Fourth
Amendment is subordinate to the judicial process, and searches without
authority from a judge are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."68
The Fourth Amendment does not bar all searches and seizures; only
those that are unreasonable. 6 9 To determine reasonableness, the courts
must look at the governmental interest that underlies the intrusion of
the search against the interest of the individual. 70 In other words,
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search entails."' 7 1 The government official making the intrusion must
have specific articulable facts used in conjunction with rational inferences to support a finding of reasonableness. 7 2 Because the Fourth
Amendment is one of reasonableness, the facts of each case must be evaluated by an objective standard. 73 Anything less than that would allow
64. Davis, 482 F.2d at 905 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
"'Katz imposes a twofold requirement [for Fourth Amendment protection], first that a person have [sic] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id.
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
66. Id. at 352-53.
67. Id. at 353. "[Olnce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply 'areas' - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that
the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id.
68. Id at 357; Carrollv. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1923) (allowing the search of an
automobile where obtaining a warrant is impracticable because the vehicle may leave the
scene); McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948) (eliminating need for a search warrant when police enter as the result of an emergency); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 17477 (1948) (allowing search in absence of probable cause when crime is in commission);
Cooper v. Cal., 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1966) (allowing search of vehicle while being held in police
custody); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (allowing search without warrant while police are in pursuit of suspect).
69. U.S. Const. amend IV.
70. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 22. In his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte,Justice Brennan stated,
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can
be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate
the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be
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searches to be legal if they are based on only a hunch. 74 "'If subjective
good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons,
75
houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."
Some searches under the Fourth Amendment are classified as administrative. 76 An administrative search does not require probable
cause as long as the search is "conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part
of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of a crime." 77 In order for
an administrative search to meet the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, it must meet the standard of reasonableness.7 8
One way to have a search avoid the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment is for the government to acquire the individual's consent to
be searched. 79 When consent to be searched is given, the consent must
be given voluntarily.8 0 The test for whether consent was voluntary is to
be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.8 1 Before
looking at the circumstances, the government must show some form of
consent-in-fact.8 2 Consequently, the government has the burden of proving that the consent given was voluntary.8 3 The government can show
84
consent-in-fact either expressly or implicitly.
One example of Fourth Amendment searches that is frequently
questioned is the checkpoint search.8 5 The Supreme Court has held that
a checkpoint stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.8 6 In the
context of border checkpoints, the checkpoints do not require a reasonably articulable suspicion because "the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy
to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens."8 7 A checkpoint stop only
judged against an objective standard.... Anything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more that inarticulate
hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
428 F.2d at 569 (emphasis in original).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
76. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 910.
79. Id. at 913.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 914.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 551. Checkpoint stops are selected as an illustrative example because airline security screenings are checkpoints.
86. Id. at 556.
87. Id. at 557.
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allows for a few questions and production of a document or two.8 8 The
checkpoint stops have been classified as administrative in nature when
weighing the intrusiveness on the right to travel.8 9
In U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, the defendant was transporting illegal
immigrants over the U.S.-Mexico border. 90 The illegal women were
found in the defendant's car as he was stopped at a border checkpoint in
San Clemente, California, sixty-six miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border. 9 1 The court applied a reasonableness test to determine whether the
stops violated the Fourth Amendment. 92 The court held that checkpoint
stops for brief questioning fit the warrant exception of the Fourth
Amendment. 93 The defendant was convicted. 9 4 The court based its decision on the theory that the intrusiveness of brief questioning at perma95
nent checkpoints was minimal and reasonable.
U.S. v. Epperson specifically addressed the constitutionality of a
88. Id. at 558.
89. Id. at 561 n. 14.
90. Id. at 548. Defendant was arrested for illegally transporting aliens. The United
States Border Patrol erected a permanent checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente,
California, sixty-six miles north of the Mexican border. Id. at 545. The property housing
the checkpoint is also used as a weighing station for the State of California. Id. at 546.
Orange cones funnel traffic into two lanes, each patrolled by a uniformed border agent. Id.
U.S. Border Patrol vehicles block the unused lanes of traffic. Id. The border agents visually screen the cars as they approach, and most cars proceed through without any questioning or close examination. Id. at 546. Some cars, however, are directed to a secondary
inspection area. Id. Cars held here are generally detained for about three to five minutes.
Id. at 547. Defendant approached the checkpoint with two female passengers, who were
illegal Mexican aliens. Id. The women entered the United States at San Ysidro using false
papers, and they met the defendant in San Diego, where he agreed to transport them north
• Id. At the San Clemente checkpoint, defendant's car was directed to the secondary inspection area. Id. at 547. Defendant proved that he was a legal alien, but the women
admitted to entering the United States illegally. Id. Prior to trial, defendant moved to
suppress evidence obtained from the stop at the checkpoint on grounds that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 548. His motion was denied, and he was convicted on
both counts. Id. Defendant appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment unless the stop was based
on a reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. at 549. A similar case arose in Sarita, Texas, and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 550. The only difference between the checkpoints in California and Texas is
the Texas checkpoint stops all vehicles for brief questioning. Id. Because of the conflicting
rulings from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 551.
91. Id. at 545-47.
92. Id. at 565. Factors of reasonableness, with regard to checkpoint stops, include "the
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the
absence of a warrant." Id. at 565-66.
93. Id. at 566.
94. Id. at 548.
95. Id. at 562.
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magnetometer in an airport. 96 Defendant Epperson was convicted of attempting to board an aircraft engaged in interstate commerce while carrying a concealed weapon. 97 Epperson activated the magnetometer
because he was carrying several metal objects on his person, and he activated the magnetometer after removing the metal objects. 98 The U.S.
Marshal running the magnetometer searched Epperson's jacket and
found a loaded pistol. 99 The court reasoned that the searches forbidden
by the Fourth Amendment were those searches that did not meet the
standard of reasonableness. 10 0 The court also used a two step balancing
test in determining the validity of the search: 1) "the search must be
'justified at its inception"' and 2) "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" 10 1 Using
this test, the court held that a physical search following an activation of
the magnetometer did not violate the Fourth Amendment.102
In U.S. v. Davis, defendant Davis was told at the loading gate that
"a routine security check was necessary."1 0 3 An airline employee opened
Davis's briefcase and found a loaded gun.' 0 4 Government officials then
took Davis to a private room, searched his person, and took him into
custody.105 The court extended the constitutional protections of initial
air passenger screenings, holding that the screenings themselves are not
96. U.S. v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947, 32 L.
Ed.2d 334, 92 S. Ct. 2050 (1972).
97. Id. at 770. Defendant Epperson was boarding a flight to New York City on November 29, 1970. Id. Before reaching the gate, all passengers went through a magnetometer to
scan for metal objects. Id. Epperson appealed his conviction to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was denied. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 771.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 772.
103. Davis, 482 F.2d at 896.
104. Id. Defendant was charged with one count of attempting to board an aircraft with
a concealed weapon. Id. at 895. Defendant and his friend checked in for a Trans World
Airlines (TWA) flight, departing from San Francisco International Airport to Bangkok,
Thailand, with a stopover at Los Angeles International Airport. Id. at 896. Defendant was
only scheduled to fly the leg from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Id. at 896. When defendant reached the gate, a TWA employee told him that a "routine security check" was required. Id. The employee opened defendant's briefcase and discovered a gun. Id. He
asked a U.S. Customs Serv. agent to check the gun, and the agent said the gun was loaded.
Id. The employee, customs agent and a U.S. Deputy Marshal escorted the defendant to a
nearby room to search his person. Id. After the search the marshal took defendant into
custody. Id. at 896. Defendant pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search. A magistrate denied the motion and convicted defendant. Id.
Defendant appealed to the U.S. District Court, which affirmed his conviction. Id. Defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
105. Id.
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"per se" violations of the Fourth Amendment, but the searches must be
done with the passenger's consent.' 0 6 The court reasoned that when
consent to a search is required, the consent must be given voluntarily
and free from duress or coercion.' 0 7 It is the government who bears the
08
burden of proving consent.'
In Terry v. Ohio, defendant Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon on the street.10 9 The undercover police officer suspected
that the suspects were casing a department store and feared that defendant Terry had a gun. He apprehended the individuals and frisked the
outside of Terry's jacket. 1 10 The court held that a police officer can conduct a limited search of a person's outer clothing to discover the existence of weapons when the officer has a reasonable belief that the person
may be armed and dangerous."' The Terry Court reasoned that a warrantless search, including a frisk, must be accompanied by a reasonable
1 12
suspicion, not just "inarticulate hunches."
106. Id. at 895-96.
107. Id. at 914.
108. Id.
109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Id. at 7. Officer McFadden was patrolling in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland. Id. at 5.
Defendant and his friend were standing on a corner. Id. McFadden patrolled the area for
thirty years to prevent shoplifting and pickpocketing. Id. He walked around and observed
individuals' habits and behavior Id. at 5. McFadden looked at defendant and his friend and
did not like the way that they looked. Id. He took up a position about 300 to 400 feet from
the two men. Id. at 5-6. He observed them walk past a store window and peer in and then
confer. Id. at 6. The men repeated the action about five or six times. Id. They then began
walking down the street. Id. at 6. McFadden became suspicious, believed they were casing
the store, and feared that one of them had a gun. Id. McFadden saw the men stop in front
of another store and approached them, identifying himself as a police officer. Id. at 6-7.
After one of the men "'mumbled something,'" McFadden grabbed the defendant and began
to pat him down on the outside of his clothing. Id. at 7. McFadden found a gun in one of
defendant's pockets in his overcoat, but he could not remove it. Id. He ordered the men
into a store, where he completely removed defendant's coat and took out the gun. Id. at 7.
McFadden patted down the other man and found a second gun. Id. He testified that his
hands never went underneath the outer garments of either man. Id. Defendant moved to
suppress evidence discovered during the pat down. Id. The trial court denied the motion,
but rejected the prosecution's argument that McFadden had probable cause to pat down
the men to find weapons. Id. at 7-8. Both men waived a jury trial, pleaded not guilty, and
were convicted. Id. at 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme
Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal, holding that "no 'substantial constitutional question'
was involved." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of "whether the
admission of the revolvers in evidence violated petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth [Amendment]." Id.
110. Id. at 6-7.
111. Id. at 30.
112. Id. at 21-22.

420

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW
C.

[Vol. XXI

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF AIRLINE SECURITY MEASURES

Using an airplane to travel across the United States has become
commonplace just like "boarding a bus or train fifty years ago, or mount1 13
ing a horse-drawn carriage around the turn of the twentieth century."
The right to travel is an important aspect of the liberty that one cannot
1 14
be deprived of without due process under the Fifth Amendment.
"Governmental restrictions upon freedom to travel are to be weighed
against the necessity advanced to justify them, and a restriction that
burdens the right to travel 'too broadly and indiscriminately' cannot be
sustained." 1 5 The right to travel cannot be granted because the individual abrogated another constitutional right, "absent a compelling state
interest."116
113. U.S. v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989). Claimant
Campbell was set to fly on United Airlines from Seattle (Sea-Tac) International Airport to
Los Angeles on January 5, 1987, when he placed his locked briefcase on the x-ray scanner
conveyer belt. Id. at 1241. The security officer, Boswell, operating the scanner stopped the
conveyer when he noticed a dark mass on his screen, detecting something in Campbell's
suitcase. Id. The officer asked Campbell to open the briefcase, but Campbell was reluctant, and he finally assented when he agreed to open it behind a screen. Id. A second
officer, Kangas, searched the briefcase and discovered a large amount of United States
currency. Id. This officer briefly questioned Campbell, and then she released him and the
briefcase. Id. The security officers have an agreement at Sea-Tac to report sums of currency exceeding $10,000 to the United States Customs Service. Id. In return the Customs
Service gives the security employees a $250 reward. Id. Kangas called Customs Agent
Symms to report that Campbell was carrying a large amount of money in his briefcase. Id.
She gave Symms a description of Campbell, his briefcase and his destination. Id. Symms
called Drug Enforcement Administration Agent Guevarra at Los Angeles International
Airport, relaying to him all the information learned from Kangas. Id. Guevarra and Agent
Amato met Campbell's flight at Los Angeles International and began running surveillance
on him. Id. The agents approached Campbell after he retrieved his checked baggage, and
they began to question him. Id. Campbell admitted to the agents that he was carrying
$130,000, but that the money did not belong to him; it belonged to a friend. Id. at 1242. He
told the agents that his friend hired him "to ransom a stolen painting," and that he took the
money with him to Seattle because he did not feel comfortable leaving the money at home.
Id. Campbell gave no identifying information for his friend. Id. DEA agents took the briefcase to their office for investigation because they did not believe Campbell's story. Id.
Amato told Campbell to open the briefcase or he would get a search warrant. Id. Campbell
opened the briefcase and found currency, among other things. Id. A narcotic's sniffing dog
detected an illegal narcotic on the currency. Id. The United States filed a civil forfeiture
claim, and Campbell moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of the briefcase. Id. His motion was denied, and the court found for the United States. Id.
114. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). Freedom of movement is deeply rooted in
American society. Id. at 126. Travel may be necessary for one to perform his livelihood.
Id. "'[O]ur nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go
where he pleases.'" Id. (quoting Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787
at 197 (1956)).
115. Davis, 482 F.2d at 912.
116. Id. at 913.
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The only searches that are covered under the Fourth Amendment
are those conducted by the government and its agents. 117 The Fourth
Amendment has four tests to determine whether the private conduct in
question is attributable to the government: 1) nexus test; 2) symbiotic
relationship; 3) joint action; and 4) public function. 1 8 Administrative
searches, like other governmental searches, are still governed by the reasonableness standard. 1 19 "Screening searches of airline passengers are
conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose . .. "12o "A generalized law enforcement search
of all passengers as a condition for boarding a commercial aircraft would
plainly be unconstitutional." 1 2 1 The United States has "'significantly involved itself" in passenger and baggage screening from the inception of
airport security.12 2 With regard to airline security, the courts generally
use the public function test, holding that routine security meets the requirements of the constitution because the "compelling public interest 1in
23
curbing air piracy generally outweighs their limited intrusiveness."
"Each element of the airport security program [is] to make certain that
is
neither the passenger's right to travel nor his right to personal privacy
124
burdened beyond the clear necessities of current circumstances."

117. Gallagherv. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 1447. The nexus test asks whether "'there is a sufficiently close nexus' between the government and the challenged conduct such that the conduct 'may be fairly
treated as of the State itself.'" Id. at 1448 (citing Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The symbiotic relationship looks at "if the state 'has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence' with a private party that 'it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.'" Id. at 1451 (quoting in part, Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). The joint action test examines
whether "a private party is a 'willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents.'" Id. at 1453 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). The public function test questions "if the state delegates to a private party a function 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,'" Id. at 1456 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352), "then the
private party is necessarily a state actor." Id. (citing Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 624-28 (1991); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)).
119. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1243.
120. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
121. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1243. The Court in Davis said, "It is significant that the regulations establishing the airport search program do not authorize or require compelled searches." 482 F.2d at 911.
122. Id. at 897 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
123. U.S. v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1995).
124. Davis, 482 F.2d at 913.
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ANALYSIS

This section will examine the effectiveness, legality, and policy considerations of both the current security measures and the necessary, proposed security measures.
A.

1.

CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the current security measures is poor. The necessary security issues needed to make the skies safer will never get done
because of Congressmen pandering to airline interests. 125 One security
measure that is under fire is the passenger screenings. 126 Most of the
calls for changes in the screening methods following the September 11
attacks resulted from the information that the hijackers did not use explosives or metal objects, but instead they used items that cannot be easily detected by a metal detector. 127 The current security scanning
systems cannot detect weapons, such as those made from graphite epoxy
and other similar materials. 128 The purpose of the additional, random
security screenings was to pick up weapons or other suspicious materials
29
that the initial metal detectors and x-rays did not catch.1
Unfortunately, these random screenings generally only search those
individuals who pose no real threat to airline security.' 30 If the initial
screeners perform their job as expected, the random screenings are redundant. 13 1 However, others believe that it is nonsensical to eliminate
the random screenings. 13 2 Those who support the random screenings
say that even though the initial screening personnel is trained by the
federal government, it is not worth removing an extra layer of security. 1 33 "The best security involves multiple layers, where you have back125. See Return Security To Upright Position, N.Y. Daily News Editorial 42 7 (Sept.
26, 2002). "Most distressing, though, is Washington's congenital inability to stay the
course when it comes to securing the skies. Airline watchdogs have decried this decadeslong pattern of urging more security, then retreating from costly measures under industry
pressure." This opinion is most commonly associated with those commentators who have a
cynical view of any changes to airline security measures. Id.
126. See id. at 6.
127. Ed Scannell & Cathleen Moore, Airport Technology Expected To Improve In Attack
Aftermath, Computerworld
2 <http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/
story/0,10801,63822,00.html> (Sept. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Scannell].
128. Id. at 3.
129. Return Security, supra n. 125, at 3.
130. Id. at 6. See supran. 12 (illustrating examples of individuals stopped for random
screenings).
131. Random Security, supra n. 4, at $ 8.
132. Return Security, supra n. 125, at 6.
133. Id.
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ups and backups to backups."' 3 4 In the early stages of the era of federal
screeners, the screeners are doing their job effectively, and there are less
news reports of screeners allowing guns and other weapons through security checkpoints. After looking at the embarrassments the screenings
have caused, they do not meet the goals of airline security.
In conjunction with passenger screenings, Congress has also taken
steps to enhance the screening of baggage that is placed in the belly of
the aircraft. 135 Not all baggage gets screened, and the only time the baggage is matched with the passenger is at check-in. 136 That method of
screening is not effective because there is no guarantee that each and
every passenger will actually get on the plane. It is not efficient for the
airlines to have to match bags to passengers on each and every flight
because connecting flights would be delayed and passengers get bumped
from flights by overbooking and flying standby. 137 As an example, in
January 2002, "93 American Airlines flights at St. Louis's Lambert Airport were delayed two different days .. . after the FAA questioned the
airline's inspections of some checked bags." 138 Only screening baggage,
but not people, for explosives is not the answer. 13 9 Passengers expect
the airline system to perform at a high level of efficiency, 140 and if long
delays cause economic hardship, air travel will be reduced, and there will
be little need for security measures.
Other security measures have mixed results in the realm of effectiveness. First, another security measure being criticized is the air (sky)
marshal program. Many flights do not have an air marshal on board.141
134. Random Security, supra n. 4, at 2.
135. See Mineta, supra n. 39 (illustrating Congress's improvements to baggage
screening).
136. Sloan, supra n. 8, at 1 11.
137. Mineta, supra n. 39, at 8. "Airlines have warned that this option could cause
massive delays if they [are] forced to remove bags every time a passenger misses a connection or is bumped from an overbooked flight." Id.
138. Koch II, supra n. 40, at 12.
139. See Mineta, supra n. 39, at I 11. "You have to allow for the possibility of a suicide
bomber, someone who doesn't care if [they are] on the airplane and it blows up' said Pat
Friend, president of the Association of Flight Attendants." Id.
6-7 <http://www.cnn.com/2002/TRAVEL/
140. CNN, Bill Would Delay Bag Screening
ADVISOR/11/14/airport.security.ap/index.html> (accessed Nov. 14, 2002).
141. Sloan, supra n. 8, at 1 11. Some pilots have never had an air marshal on their
plane. Patricia Valenzuela, Local Pilot Says Little Has Changed In The Air, Daily Democrat
13 <http://www.dailydemocrat.com/archives/index.inn?loc=detail&doc=/2002/September/09-621-news3.txt> (Sept. 10, 2002). Lanny Ropke, a pilot for 39 years, 29 with
American Airlines, has never had an air marshal on his plane. Id. at $ 2. Those who are
cynical of the program believe that the sky marshals are only used on the flights going to
and from Washington D.C. Id. at $ 14. Ropke said, "[Tihey fly out of Washington, D.C.
because they are protecting the senators and congressmen." Id.
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There are some credible problems with the air marshal program. 142
Moreover, the air marshal program can be greatly effective if it receives
a little fine-tuning. 14 3 Second, one of the best changes made was placing
the security screening personnel under the control of the TSA. 14 4 Because the federal screeners were just put in place at most airports, it is
hard to judge the results. 14 5 However, the screeners will be relatively
more successful than the private companies because there is more accountability, since the screeners are now federal employees.

B.

PROPOSED SECURITY MEASURES

Because of the many problems in the current airline security measures noted above, this section will examine what measures should be
adopted, meeting two goals: 1) maximum safety in the skies and 2) efficiency in moving airline passengers through airports.
142. Sloan, supra n. 8, at 23. First, every flight needs to have an air marshal because
it is not possible to foresee every possible security problem that may occur. Id. Second,
having an air marshal alone is not sufficient because the marshal must be properly trained.
Id. "Air marshals, too, are being rushed through training, and the [training] standards are
being compromised to get more armed marshals aboard." Id. at 22. An example of poor
hiring and training occurred on a flight originating from Philadelphia International Airport. On a Delta Airlines flight between Atlanta and Philadelphia, air marshals restrained
an unruly passenger and held all the other passengers at gunpoint. World News Tonight
with Peter Jennings, "A Closer Look Air Marshals Fright" 4 (ABC Oct. 3, 2002) (TV
broadcast, transcript available in LEXIS, News, Transcripts) [hereinafter World News Tonight]. A sky marshal detained Dr. Bob Rajcoomar, who was of Middle Eastern descent
and a naturalized U.S. citizen, and Judge James Lineberger because of the way they appeared and looked at the sky marshal. Id. at 11. After doing some investigating, ABC
News reporter Lisa Stark discovered that this individual hired as a sky marshal failed a
psychological exam during his application to become an officer with the Philadelphia Police
Department. Id. at 13. A psychological exam is not required for sky marshals. Id. at
14.
143. All air marshals should be required to meet the same standards of those who graduate from police academies, including passing a psychological examination. Id. at 15.
144. The main idea behind federalizing the screeners is that better paid and trained
personnel will produce better results, which, in this case, means less weapons getting
through security checkpoints. Return Security, supra n. 125, at 2.
145. This creates two problems. First, the new screeners have to prove themselves,
Random Security, supra n. 4, at 8, because government cannot make laws based on the
results of untested personnel. Return Security, supra n. 125, at 6. Technically, the Congress can make laws based on untested information, but it would be unwise and may endanger the air passengers. Making laws based on untested screeners would be like a doctor
making a diagnosis and giving a prescription without examining the patient. Second, because Congress mandated that the screeners be federalized, the Transportation Security
20.
Administration is scrambling to get all the screeners hired. Sloan, supra n. 8, at
"Fifty percent of the applicants don't show up, and [fifty] percent of the remaining applicants don't qualify." Id. at 21.
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Effectiveness

Elimination of random searches is essential in making airline security safer and more efficient. 146 One way to make random screenings obsolete is to improve the initial screening technology in the airports.
Many airline security experts predict that one of the first improvements
that will be made by airports is better screening technology. 147 The new
technology will be able to detect more than just metal objects. 148 While
waiting for the new technology to become available, it is best to make
improvements to the existing equipment for the time being.149 Increased technology makes the human screeners work more efficiently because they can focus on those passengers who pose the greatest
threat. 150 The best way to protect airports is to combine several technologies. 151 One technology that is more effective than a simple metal de15 2
tector is a magnetometer, or more commonly called body scanning.
The body scanning technology is currently available, but it is not in wide15 3
spread use.
In conjunction with the magnetometer, airports can install technologies that puff air on individuals passing through the magnetometer, and
the air is analyzed for explosive residue.1 54 No airport has any technol146. See Good Judgment, supra n. 15 (illustrating examples of random security screenings). One quick way to reach this goal is for Congress to pass a bill currently in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Tom Ramstack, House PreparesAirline Relief Bill;.Limits Liability, Eases Searches, Wash. Times Page One A01 (Sept. 28, 2002). The bill would eliminate the need for random searches at passenger gates and create a profiling system that
would identify suspected terrorists before check-in at airports. Id. at $ 3.
147. Scannell, supra n. 127, at 1 1.
148. Allan Chernoff, New Devices Could Boost Airport Security 2 <http://www.cnn.
comI2001fIRAVEL/NEWS/12/26/rec.security.devices/index.html> (accessed Oct. 5, 2002).
149. Id. at 11.
150. Scannell, supra n. 127, at 17. Marc Enger, former U.S. Army intelligence officer
and current executive vice president of security operations at Digital Defense, Inc., a computer security consulting company, states, "[Y]ou want humans to check the false positives,
as opposed to making the humans look at all luggage and each passenger. Technology can
let the human intervene in security more effectively." Id.
151. Chernoff, supra n. 148, at T 5. Kenneth Wood of Barringer Technologies, Inc. said,
"[y]ou need a multitude of technologies, a system of technologies, to provide as total a solution as you can to contraband your terrorist threat." Id.
152. The body scanning technology is currently being used by the United States Customs Service to catch smugglers. Kathleen Koch, Airports Seek Bomb-Detection Options
4 <http://www.cnn.com/2001/us/12/30/explosive.detection/index.html> (accessed Oct. 5,
2002) [Hereinafter Koch III].
153. Scannell, supra n. 127, at 5.
154. Chernoff, supra n. 148, at 3. There are two companies that currently make the
air puff technology: Barringer Technologies, Inc. makes The Sentinel, and Ion Track Instruments has the Entry Scan. Id.
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ogy with the ability to check for explosives on people. 155 Obviously, the
air puff technology is designed to detect explosives, but the magnetometer will also detect explosives because the device gives the screener a
mechanical survey of the passenger's clothing and body. 15 6 These technologies are much more effective than current screening technology be15 7
cause the magnetometer can detect much more than metal objects.
Moreover, database technology can be used more effectively prior to
any security screenings at the airport. The U.S. Department of Transportation wants to require airlines to make changes to their reservation
systems to be able to red flag a suspected terrorist's name. 158 The government believes that security can be improved by stopping terrorists as
soon as they get into the airport. 15 9 While this may be a very effective
way to stop known terrorists, it has two problems. First, if the terrorist
flies under an alias, the profile would need to have all known aliases
listed in the database. Second, it will not be feasible for sometime because the current software in the reservations system can only perform
one function.' 60 "'The reservation system is meant for doing one thing:
acting at a very secure high speed with high availability. It is not looking for triggers,' like a terrorist's name in the passenger list for a
flight." 16 1 The flagging function would be easy to write in if the reserva162
tion software was a relational database.
Requiring the airlines to upgrade their computer networks "could
1 63
cause a bottleneck that would bring the . . . networks . . . to a halt."
155. Id. at $ 4. Paul Eisenbraun of Ion Track Instruments stated, "[t]here has not been
any real device at any of the security checkpoints that has the ability to detect any explosives on people." Id. Both Ion Track Instruments and Barringer Technologies are awaiting
federal approval of their respective technologies. Id.
156. Kathryn A. Buckner, School Drug Tests: A FourthAmendment Perspective, 1987 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 275, 290 n. 95 (1987).
157. The air puff technology is ninety-nine percent effective. Koch III, supra n. 152, at
5.
158. Jennifer DiSabatino, Air Security May Require IT Overhaul 2 <http://www.cnn.
com2001TECH/industry/10/23/airport.security.idglindex.html> (accessed Oct. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter DiSabatino I].
159. See id. (allowing airlines to have suspected terrorists detained prior to entering
security checkpoints).
160. Id.
161. Id. at T 13.
162. Id. at $ 2. A database is "a file or collection of data structured in logical relationships." Matt Hayden, Teach Yourself Networking in 24 Hours, 394 (1st ed. SAMS Publishing 1998) [Hereinafter Hayden]. A relational database is "a program that allows files to be
related to each other so that changes in one file are reflected in other files automatically."
George Beckman, Computer Confluence, 467 (3rd ed. Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 1999).
163. DiSabatino, supra n. 158, at
2. IBM built the first reservations database, a
transactional database, forty years ago. Id. at 6. The transactional database is stored on
a mainframe computer system. Id. A global distribution system gives travel agents and
Internet sites remote access to the reservations system. Id. at 7. One company is begin-

20031

"COST" OF SECURING DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL

Implementing these possible changes will be expensive and take a long
time, even if enough changes are made only to make the system temporarily functional. 164 The Federal Aviation Administration wants to get the
changes in place as soon as possible, but the administration is not sure
who would be responsible for funding the project. 16 5 However, making
the changes is not just a matter of changing some code; a structural overhaul is necessary. 166 One possible solution would be to create a new
database, which would allow the reservation system to send the names of
passengers first to the global distribution system, and then to the new
database to scan the passenger profiles, which would have the ability to
16 7
do the queries that the old system cannot.
The Central Intelligence Agency is supporting an additional data
analysis tool, similar to that used in casinos, to be used with reservation
systems. 168 The technology can be a very effective security tool because
the technology runs in batch mode, 16 9 and for reservations made within
forty-eight hours, the software spools information from the mainframe
reservation system and analyzes the records in almost real time. 170 The
technology has the capability to detect transposed digits in a driver's license number, and whether a passenger lives near a suspected terrorist.' 7 1 Currently, the largest use of the software is analyzing data from
400 different sources with about one million records in total. 17 2 This
ning to make changes to the reservations system. Sabre Holdings Corp., who created the
global distribution system, is contracting with Compaq Computer Corp. to move the transactional database from the mainframe to a server. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at %9. Sabre's contract with Compaq will be worth about $100 million. Id. at
8.
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id. at 9121. Tom Cook, former president of Sabre Holdings, stated that "[Tihe code
is old and structured. Making changes in the TPF environment is orders of magnitude
more difficult than it is in a modern environment." Id. at 9121.
167. Id. at 24. Michael Hulley, vice president of the Global Travel and Transportation
Industry unit at IBM, says that biometric capability could be added to the new database.
Id. at 9125. One option would be to use a retinal scanner. Id.
168. Jennifer DiSabatino, CLA-Backed Analysis Tool Eyed For Passenger Checks 911
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/industry/01/03/cia.data.analysis.idglindex.html>
(accessed Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter DiSabatino II]. Systems Research and Development Corp.
in Las Vegas, Nevada created the software. Id. at 9 4. Its purpose was to clean incorrectly
entered reservation data and check for connections between passengers and suspected terrorists. Id. "[1It can check a passenger's name, address, phone number, and other identifying information against those of people who are believed to be terrorists." Id.
169. Batch mode (processing) is "a situation common in early mainframe environments
in which many tasks were scheduled to run at a specific time late in the evening. The user
never interacted with the computer in batch processing." Hayden, supra n. 162, at 393.
170. DiSabatino II, supra n. 168, at T16.
171. Id. at 9 5.
172. Id. at 9.

428

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXI

73
software can catch trends that may not be visible by the human eye.1
of their
The best use for this software is for airlines because of the size 174
reservation databases and the amount of information available.
Beyond screening technology, there are other steps that can be
taken to improve the effectiveness of the security measures. First, some
airlines are utilizing facial recognition technology at their ticket counters
in an attempt to catch suspected terrorists. 1 75 Facial recognition technology has the potential to be highly effective in airport security, but it is
not yet ready. 176 The reason that the facial recognition technology is not
in effect right now is that there are several major limitations on the technology, such as identity fraud and the limited number of images in
databases. 177 Second, air marshals are not enough; 178 pilots should be

armed. 179
2. Legal Considerations
Simply because the above security measures are most effective, they
can only be adopted if they pass constitutional muster. The two proposed
security measures that are subject to the search requirements of the
Fourth Amendment are the magnetometer and the passenger profiling
173. Id. at 1 10.
174. Id. at 11. The original use of the software was to prevent credit card fraud and to
8.
track big winners and cheaters in the gaming industry. Id. at
175. Scannell, supra n. 127, at 1 11. Facial recognition technology, created by Viisage
Technology, Inc., is already used in two airports in Europe in conjunction with the screening technologies used at U.S. airports. Id. at 12. Tom Colatosti, President and CEO of
Viisage, explains how the facial recognition technology works: "Facial recognition systems
scan passers-by, taking identifiable facial measurements such as the distance between
eyes, angle of the nose and thickness of lips. The systems can find a match against a
database in less than one second." Id. at 13. Three U.S. airports plan on implementing
facial recognition technology: Logan International Airport in Boston, T.F. Green Airport in
Providence, and Fresno Yosemite International Airport in California. Jack H. Daniel III,
Reform in Airline Security: Panic or Precaution?, 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1623, 1635 (2002).
14. As an example of success, two of the hijackers on
176. Scannell, supra n. 127, at
September 11 had profiles in the FBI terrorist database, and if the airports were using the
facial recognition technology, those hijackers may never have been able to get on the plane.
Id.
15. Additionally, in certain conditions, the technology is more likely to
177. Id. at
produce false positives and missing people in the database. Daniel, supra n. 175, at 1635
(citing a study by the U.S. Dept, of Defense). There are also other technologies that employ
biometric scanning to identify individuals, but those technologies are years away from
widespread use. Scannell, supra n. 127, at 6.
178. Valenzuela, supra n. 141, at 13.
18. This measure has the endorsement of the American Airlines pilots
179. Id. at
union. Id. Those opposed to this measure say arming pilots is not an effective measure
because not all people are good with guns. Id. at 19. Many people do not feel comfortable
with this measure because a misfired bullet could pierce the fuselage and cause a dangerous drop in cabin pressure. Id. at if 22.
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databases.18 0 The use of a magnetometer as a method of screening airline passengers is a search within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment.18 1 The administrative search caused by the magnetometer is so
limited that it is excused from the warrant requirement.' 8 2 "The ultimate standard of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[,] l8 3 [a]nd
the reasonableness of a search depends upon the facts and circumstances
and the total atmosphere of each case." 18 4 In examining each case, the
court must look at the governmental interest involved that justifies the
invasion of privacy.' 8 5 The need for a thorough inspection is critical in
airline security because if a plane is hijacked, it can be used as a weapon
of mass destruction to kill not only those in the plane, but also those on
the ground.' 8 6 Two concerns exist with the use of the magnetometer for
airport screening: 1) The purpose to stop hijackings may dissipate while
the magnetometers exist, and 2) a search simply used for finding weapons may expand to search for contraband, beyond its express purpose of
87
airline safety.'
In support of these concerns, the court in Davis stated that even if
the government interest is compelling and substantial, the means supporting that interest must be applied narrowly so as not to stifle fundamental liberties.' 8 8 The amount of the invasion of privacy is relatively
minimal with a magnetometer because the search image is extremely
brief, and it is less intrusive because there is no physical contact, and
objectively, there is no discretion given to the screener.' 8 9 The other option to make sure that no weapons or explosives are carried onto a plane
would be to physically search all passengers, which would be a more intrusive approach as opposed to the magnetometer.
180. Air marshals will not be discussed in this subsection because they do not raise any
issues under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, would be beyond the scope of this
comment.
181. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
182. Id. at 771.
183. U.S. v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973)).
184. Id. (citing Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 804-05. Justice Oakes wrote,
Depriving a hijacker of his weapon is critical, because by means of a weapon like a
pistol or even a knife the hijacker may literally turn the plane itself into a weapon,
threatening not only those within it, but those on the ground as well. In short, the
plane may become a weapon of mass destruction that no ordinary person would
have any way of obtaining except through a hijacking.

Id.
187. Id. at 805.
188. Davis, 482 F.2d at 912-13.
189. Buckner, supra n. 156, at 290 n. 95.
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The constitutionality of the magnetometer and air puff can be inferred by analogy to Martinez-Fuerteand Epperson. The magnetometer
used in Epperson was implemented for the sole purpose of detecting
metal on passengers1 90 because that was the composite material of most
weapons like guns and knives. Today, guns and knives are made from
materials that are non-metallic and escape the capabilities of the older
magnetometers. The purpose of the new magnetometers remains the
same from the magnetometers in Epperson. Additionally, opponents of
the new magnetometers will argue that the body scanning will be too
large of an invasion of privacy because the scan will penetrate the surface of a passenger's clothing unlike the current magnetometers. This
argument fails when one looks at the United States Supreme Court's decision in Martinez-Fuerte.19 1 The standard governing checkpoint
searches is one of reasonableness. It is reasonable to believe that a passenger who attempts to bring down a plane may attempt to do so by using explosives or other objects not made of metal. Consequently, it is
reasonable to be able to scan a person's body for explosives and other
objects because it is the least intrusive way to prevent those objects from
being carried onto an airplane. Any other alternative form of search will
be more intrusive because a person will physically do the search. Therefore, the use of a magnetometer and air puff technology to screen for nonmetal objects would be constitutional.
Profiling of passengers and the use of profiling technologies, such as
face recognition software, raises several concerns about the Fourth
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has favorably articulated that
government officials have the right to stop an individual and ask for cursory information.192 This information includes the identification of the
official to the individual, a request for an interview, and asking to see the
individual's identification and airline ticket. 193 This information can be
obtained as long as "'a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the
police and go about his business' and 'as long as the police do not convey
a message that compliance with their requests is required."1 94 The government has the burden of proving consent, and showing mere lawful
submission does not meet that burden.' 9 5 For a seizure to be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment requirements, "the officers must have
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that [the person] had committed
190. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
191. See generally Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality

of permanent checkpoint screenings).
192. U.S. v. Taylor, 956 F.2d. 572, 580 (6thCir. 1992) (Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 952, 121 L. Ed.2d 330, 113 S. Ct. 404 (1992).

193. Id. at 577 (majority opinion).
194. Id. at 580 (Keith, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 588.
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or was about to commit a crime," 19 6 and the suspicion must be "more
than an unparticularized hunch or suspicion." 197 For example, "innocent
travellers [sic] cannot 'be subject to virtually random seizures' merely
because of their race." 198 Some circumstances cannot be given any
weight in determining the reasonable articulable suspicion because the
amount of innocent travelers subjected would be too large. 199 For example, the court in Berryman held that the purchase of a one-way ticket
with cash was not sufficient by itself to establish a reasonable suspicion,
20 0
even though it fit the drug courier profile.
The profiling done at airports under the proposed security measures
occurs by two parties: the airline ticket agents and the federal security
screeners, who would be responsible for measures like the face recognition technology. All of the above rules apply to the federal screeners because they are agents of the federal government. The face recognition
technology would be within the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
because any screening beyond the initial screening all travelers must
submit to would be based on a reasonable articulable suspicion. The face
recognition technology uses very specific measurements of an individual's physical features to determine if there is a match with a person in
the database. The people would only be in the database if they were on a
196. Buffkins, 922 F.2d at 469.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 470.
199. U.S. v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651, 654 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 80
L. Ed.2d 125, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984). On September 8, 1981, defendant's flight arrived at
Logan International Airport in Boston from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Id. at 652. Fort
Lauderdale is a "'source city'" for many illegal narcotics. Id. Two DEA agents saw Berryman be the last to exit the aircraft, walk quickly to the baggage claim, and constantly
look over his shoulders. Id. At the baggage claim, defendant retrieved one bag and was
looking around as if someone was suppose to meet him. Id. He later admitted that he was
waiting for his wife to pick him up. Id. at 652. As the defendant waited along the curb, the
agents began to question him. Id. The agents asked if they could ask him a few questions,
and after he agreed, they asked where he came from. Id. at 653. Defendant provided the
agents with his ticket and identification. Id. The defendant had a one-way ticket, which
was paid for in cash. Id. The defendant consented to having his suitcase searched, and one
agent informed him that he could refuse permission. Id. The suitcase contained a giftwrapped package and a card. Id. The defendant consented to having the package x-rayed.
Id. The agents were still suspicious about the package, so the defendant consented to the
agents opening the package, in which the agents found two bags of cocaine. Id. The agents
then detained the defendant. Id. at 652 He was charged with knowingly possessing with
intent to distribute a controlled substance. Id. The defense moved to suppress, but the
district court denied the motion. Id. Defendant was convicted and he appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Id.
200. Id. at 656. "The profile is simply a collage of otherwise innocent characteristics
designed to guide the focus of the agent's observations, and only when the characteristics
are combined in a suspicious manner, or lead agents to observe independently suspicious
conduct is official intrusion warranted." Id.
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terrorist watch list, as an example. Innocent travelers would not be subjected to any further inspection beyond the initial screening.
The profiling of passengers has not been challenged in the appellate
courts, but the constitutionality can be analogized with Davis and Terry.
The Davis court was quite concerned about the consent to be searched at
the security checkpoints. The same consent would be required for the
profiling done by airline ticket agents because the ticket counter in effect
serves as another checkpoint. Consent at this point cannot be voluntary
because the passenger cannot turn back and refuse the search without
incurring a legally cognizable injury. If the passenger wants to board the
plane, he is required to consent to the search. If the passenger wants to
refuse the search, he is not allowed to board the plane, and he cannot
recover the money he paid for the ticket if the ticket is non-refundable.
The reasoning the Terry court used in making its decision is very
relevant to the passenger profiling issue. For a search to be within the
warrant exception, the search must be based on a reasonable suspicion,
not just a hunch. 2 0 1 Basing the profiling on a terrorist watch list or a
most wanted list will meet the Terry requirement, but simply using the
purchase of one way tickets or paying in cash as reasons to flag a passenger for a search will result in many innocent travelers being searched for
no reason at all. In effect, all air travelers who purchase a ticket at the
last minute can be subjected to a search. Therefore, measures such as
face recognition technology pass constitutional muster, but profiling by
ticket agents will only pass constitutional muster if the profiling is very
specific to each individual, will not subject large amounts of innocent
travelers to unnecessary screenings, and consent is obtained from the
passengers.
On the other hand, the profiling done by the airline ticket agents
would be done by a private party, and would only be subjected to the
above rules if it meets one of the four tests, making the conduct attributable to the government. 20 2 The profiling by ticket agents meets the
"nexus test" because the government mandates that all airline passengers be screened for weapons before boarding a plane, and the ticket
agents' conduct would be following government mandates and aiding the
government screeners in selecting those individuals who should be selected for further screenings and searches.
The symbiotic relationship test is met because if the U.S. Department of Transportation creates a regulation mandating airlines to flag
passengers with certain characteristics, not necessarily physical, the
government and the airline are interdependent and joint participants in
201. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
202. See supra n. 118 (listing the four tests of imputing conduct of a private actor to the
government).
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the activity. The joint action test is met because the airlines cannot operate without complying with the mandates. Finally, the conduct is attributable through the public function test because Congress reserves
the exclusive right to create standards regarding the screening of airline
passengers.
In conjunction with the public function test, routine security procedures are upheld because of the compelling state interest in curbing air
piracy. 20 3 "The limited nature of the intrusion makes the individual interest inconsequential when compared with the government's overwhelming interest in controlling [air piracy] ."204 One cannot balance the
general and individual interests because the general interest almost always outweighs the individual and "stretch[es] fourth amendment protections wafer thin."20 5 The current "war on terrorism" can be
analogized with the "war on drugs." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
brilliantly summarized the effect of the "war on drugs" and the effect on
constitutional rights:
Presently, our nation is plagued with the destructive effects of the
illegal importation and distribution of drugs. At this critical time, our
Constitution remains a lodestar for the protections that shall endure
the most pernicious affronts to our society. .. . The drug crisis does not
license the aggrandizement of governmental power in lieu of civil liberties. Despite the devastation wrought by drug trafficking in communities nationwide, we cannot suspend the precious rights guaranteed
by
206
the Constitution in an effort to fight the [w]ar on [d]rugs.
Additionally, the "war on terrorism" does not give the government,
working through the airlines, the right to profile based on race. After
looking at the racial makeup of the hijackers of September 11, it is easy
to see how an individual would be more inclined to more heavily scrutinize air travelers of Middle Eastern decent. Justice William Brennan, in
his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte, examined the role of profiling Mexicans
in the fight against illegal immigration. 20 7 The objective of checkpoints
at the border was to prevent Mexicans from illegally entering the United
States, and border officials had no objective standards to stop vehicles
entering, only the ancestry of the passengers. 20 8 Brennan concluded
that every person of Mexican ancestry was subject to stop, detention and
203. See Doe, 61 F.3d at 109-10 (holding that preventing air piracy is a compelling state
interest).
204. Berryman, 717 F.2d at 659.
205. Id. In offering similar analysis, the Sixth Circuit stated, "the valiant effort of our
law enforcement officers to rid society of the drug scourge cannot be done in total disregard
of an individual's constitutional rights. Taylor, 956 F.2d at 583 (Keith, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1990)).
207. See generally Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 571-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (illustrating Brennan's concern about possible natural origin discrimination).
208. Id. at 572.
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interrogation more than those of non-Mexican ancestry. 20 9
The result of these stops is unnecessary delay and humiliation for
those motorists stopped. 2 10 Brennan's comments are extremely relevant
to airline security. First, only two of the hijackers on September 11 used
their real names, 2 1 1 and innocent travelers who have names similar to
real names of people on watch lists, or who look like those on watch lists,
will be subject to extra scrutiny. Middle Eastern air travelers would be
facing the same humiliation and embarrassment that those of Mexican
ancestry face at the borders. The best way to avoid profiling based on
race is to subject all air travelers to the extra scrutiny, but the courts
have already said that subjecting all travelers to a law enforcement
212
search as a precondition to flying is unconstitutional.
C.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

One of the policy considerations that lawmakers, courts and experts
always look at is cost. It is estimated that the TSA may incur expenses
of $6.5 billion for fiscal year 2003.213 Screening costs are $3 million per
214
month and $100 million is being spent on bomb detectors for luggage.
The bag screening machines cost $1 million dollars each. 215 Arming pilots could cost $900 million to start and $250 million each year. 216 The
money is generated from several sources. The TSA can impose a uniform
fee on all air travelers to help pay for certain civil aviation security expenses. 2 17 The September 11 security fee, a $2.50 surcharge on each
2 18
Most
passenger ticket purchased, generated $2.2 billion in revenue.
of the TSA's $4.8 billion fiscal year 2003 budget will come from Congress. 2 19 For fiscal year 2002, Congress allocated $500 million for air209. Id. Justice Brennan wrote,
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in
this country must know after today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint
highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and
interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists.

Id.
210. Id. at 573.
211. See Koch I, supra n. 14 (stating that not all September 11 hijackers used their real
names).
212. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1243 (declaring that giving all passengers a
law enforcement search is unconstitutional).
213. Schneider & Goo, Twin Missions Overwhelmed TSA; Airport Agency Strives to Create Self, Stop Terror, Wash. Post A Section Al
12 (Sept. 3, 2002).
214. Hartman & Flynn, supra n. 10, at 43.
215. Sloan, supra n. 8, at 19.
216. Bill Would Delay Bag Screening, supra n. 140, at 16.
217. 115 Stat. at 625.
218. Hartman & Flynn, supra n. 10, at 42.
219. Id.
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craft security improvements 2 20 and $1.5 billion to reimburse airports for
221
the money they have spent meeting the new federal guidelines.
The problem with these funding sources is twofold. First, being dependent on government funding is not a stable funding source because
tax revenues shrink during rough economic times and many government
programs receive funding cuts. Second, the statutorily authorized security fee can only be raised so high before the prices of airline tickets gets
too expensive for people to travel. Lost passengers spell trouble for already financially troubled airlines. These airlines do not have the extra
cash to fund all the extra security, and raising ticket prices is very risky.
United Airlines recently announced that the company lost $889 million
dollars during the third quarter of 2002, its second biggest lost ever, and
United expects fourth quarter losses to be even bigger. 2 22 United cites
bleak industry conditions for its enormous losses. 2 23 As a result of these

losses, United was forced to file for bankruptcy protection. 224 However,
the economic factors put the airlines in a bind. The money is well spent
because every breach in security costs the airlines between $5 million
2 25
and $6 million.
Another policy consideration that will have a serious impact on airline security is passenger frustration. The government is in a Catch22.226 With 2 million air travelers passing through airports daily, the
security system has to be "porous enough" to filter all the passengers, yet
the goal of airline security is to catch any and all "weapons" that can be
used in air piracy.2 27 The problem for the airlines is that many layers of
220. 115 Stat. at 628.
221. Id. at 630.
222. Dave Carpenter, Bleak Forecast for United, Daily Herald Business 1 (Oct. 19,
2002). The company's operating revenue dropped by $3.7 billion, or nine percent. Id. at 2.
United has lost $4 billion since it last turned a profit in the second quarter of 2000. Id.
223. Id. at 1. The airline industry estimates losses for 2002 to reach $9 billion. CNN,
Airlines Resolve To Trim Costs 2 <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/02/biz.
trav.airlines/index.html> (accessed Mar. 27, 2003). Delta Air Lines lost $1.3 billion alone.
Patty Davis, Delta CEO: Gout. Should Help Airlines
8 <http://www.cnn.com /2003/
TRAVEL/03/26/airline.troubles/index.html> (accessed Mar. 27, 2003).
224. Davis, supra n. 223, at T 10. To help bring the airline out of bankruptcy, United's
pilots agreed to take a temporary twenty-nine percent pay cut. CNN, United Pilots, Others
Accept Pay Cut 4 <http://www.cnn.com/2003/TRAVEIJ01/08/ual.unions/index.html> (accessed Mar. 27, 2003). Two other unions, the Transport Workers Union (meteorologists)
and the Professional Airline Flight Control (dispatchers), have also agreed to take salary
cuts. Id. at 2. United has asked the bankruptcy court to require temporary pay cuts for
another union, the International Associations of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, because the union refuses to agree on wage reductions. Id. at $19.
225. Id.
226. Sloan, supra n. 8, at $ 8.
227. Id. at 9 Vincent said, "[wle have a system that moves close to 2 million people a
day, and in order to do that it has to be porous enough so people can move through it.
Therein lies the problem that faces the U.S. government." Id.
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security can cause long lines and delays and inconvenience, which ultimately cut into profits. 228 Poll numbers show the frustration of passengers. ". . . [O]nly twenty percent of travelers say they take security
precautions they did not take a year ago." 2 29 FirstAir.net conducted a
poll that showed that sixty percent of the respondents were less concerned about airline security in the past six months than they were in
230
the first six months following the September 11 attacks.
Furthermore, lawmakers were caught in an unenviable position. On
one hand, lawmakers are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and they
know that the laws they pass are subject to judicial review by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 2 3 1 On the other, the media is questioning what could
have been done to prevent the attacks, and the general public is terrified
and looking for action to be taken that can return them to a familiar
state of comfort.
III.

CONCLUSION

The events of September 11, 2001 may have been created at an earlier time in someone's imagination, 23 2 but no one ever expected that figure of imagination to become reality. In response to an extraordinary set
of events, came extraordinary actions, such as closing United States airspace to all non-military air traffic for three days. Those extraordinary
actions also resulted in an airport security overhaul. As former United
States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "[Gireat

cases like hard cases make bad law.

....

233

The action taken by Congress and the appropriate executive agencies certainly met the goal of increasing airline security, but at a large
cost, both literally and figuratively. Some of the measures are more effective than others. But just because a measure is effective does not
mean that it is constitutional. The best measures are those that are both
228. Return Security, supra n. 125, at $ 4.
229. Seventy Percent, supra n. 20, at %14.
230. Id. at 3.
231. See generallyMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (giving courts judicial review).
232. See quotation, supra n. 186 (quoting Justice Oakes from Albarado)(explaining the
concern over hijackers using planes as weapons).
233. Encyclopedia of Supreme Court Quotations 27-28 (Christopher A. Anzalone, ed.,
M.E. Sharpe 2000) (quoting from Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 364-65
(1904). The entire quote reads:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate, overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure, which makes what previously was clear, seem doubtful, and before
which even well-settled principles of law will bend.
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effective and constitutional. Airline security should look like the
following:
1) The initial screening should be done with a magnetometer, detecting
for both metal and non-metal objects, that gives the screener a mechanical survey image of the person's clothing and an x-ray scan of his or her
carry-on baggage.
2) All baggage going into the belly of the aircraft should be screened
using an explosives detection system.
3) Airline ticket agents should only be able to profile those passengers
who are on the FBI terrorist watch list and only subject individuals
with those names to additional security screenings.
4) Air marshals should be on all U.S. commercial flights and be trained
the same as other law enforcement officers across the states.
As Justice Damon Keith of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
in Taylor, just because the government interest is compelling does not
mean that the Constitution becomes subservient to that interest. 2 34 The
Constitution has survived many extraordinary events, such as the Civil
War and Great Depression, in its over 200 years of existence. The events
of September 11 are another extraordinary event to add to that list, and
when history looks back, people will say that the Constitution is still the
supreme law of the land.
Eric J. Millert
234. See Taylor, 956 F.2d at 583 (reducing the impact of the Fourth Amendment).
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